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State and local ﬁnanceWe analyse pension reforms for police ofﬁcers in England and Wales using force-level data. We quantify the
impact on overall police pension plan liabilities, examining incidence across police ofﬁcers, national and local
taxpayers. We also examine reforms of retirement rules, especially concerning early retirement on grounds of
ill-health. Differences in ill-health retirement across forces are statistically related to area-speciﬁc stresses of
policing and force-speciﬁc human resource policies. Reforms in 2006 impacted primarily on the level of
ill-health retirement among forces with above-average rates of early retirement. We ﬁnd that residual differ-
ences in post-2006 ill-health retirement rates across forces are related to differential capacities to raise
revenue from local property taxes.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
This paper considers recent reforms to the pension arrangements of
police in England and Wales. It calculates the effect of these reforms,
both immediately and in ‘steady state’, on police pension plan liabilities,
constructing a simulation model of the pension plan and changing
model parameters to reﬂect the various reforms. It examines the inci-
dence of the reduction in pension liabilities between taxpayers and
police ofﬁcers. It then utilises econometric methods to examine one
speciﬁc component of the reforms: the change in the procedures for
and ﬁnance of early retirement on grounds of ill-health, and analyses
the incidence of this reform between national and local taxpayers as
well as police ofﬁcers themselves. Given that there has been very little
academic research into public pension plans in the United Kingdom
and no research, to our knowledge, into police pensions or police labour
markets in particular, these are new contributions to the literature.
Unlike the United States, most public sector pension plans in the
United Kingdom (UK) are unfunded and operate explicitly on a
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis.1 The UK's police pension plan is no
exception. The combined projected pension liabilities (Projected, 7, Ridgmount Street, London
ing to pre-fund these plans. The
the Local Government Pension
e somewhat under-funded.
rights reserved.Beneﬁt Obligation or PBO) of these UK public sector plans were calcu-
lated in 2010–11 to be £959.5 billion2 (of which only £66.2 billion
was funded) with the projected unfunded liabilities of the police
pension plan alone estimated at £93.8 billion, or around 10% of the
total. Efforts to curtail public pension liabilities in recent years have
involved raising normal pension ages, reducing accrual rates, chang-
ing indexation provisions and reducing rates of early retirement on
grounds of ill-health. All these reform methods have been applied to
police pensions. It is however important to note at this point that
only the reform of early retirement provisions described here has an
immediate impact on police pension liabilities, since other compo-
nents of the reforms either apply only to new entrants to the police
pension plan or are subject to transitional provisions. Hence, there
are questions both on intergenerational incidence and incidence
across interest groups.
Another important feature of public pension plans in the United
Kingdom (UK) – again in contrast to the United States – is that public
sector plans in the UK are broadly nationwide plans, with common
normal pension ages, accrual rates etc. across local jurisdictions. Never-
theless, although pay and pensions are set nationally, many public
sector workers are employed and managed by local authorities;
hence many pension plans – those for police, local government em-2 In US dollars, this is a total liability of around 1.6 trillion. See Treasury (2011b).
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the local level.3 Until recently, these local authorities had considerable
discretion in workforce practices, including how they managed early
retirement on grounds of ill-health. So in the case of the police, whilst
there is a ﬁxed nationwide normal age at which police can ﬁrst retire,
local discretion has allowed rates of early retirement on grounds of
ill-health to vary widely across jurisdictions (there was no other
‘avenue’ to early retirement in the police pension plan in the
period under consideration). This local discretion raises a tension as
to ‘who pays’ for early retirement, which can be summarised as follows.
Local police services, in common with local government and ﬁre
services, are ﬁnanced by a mixture of central government grant
allocations and local taxes levied on domestic properties within
local jurisdictions. In the case of the police: until 2006, pension
payments to police ofﬁcers, whether they had retired under normal
arrangements or through ill-health retirement, were wholly ﬁnanced
by employee contributions (set at a common national rate) and by
central government grant allocations. Because local authorities had
discretion within broad government guidelines as to how they man-
aged ill-health retirement in this period, they had an incentive within
the ﬁnancing mechanism to utilise ill-health retirement as a vehicle
for removing lower quality ofﬁcers (for example, those with lower
ﬁtness or general aptitude and commitment) from their workforce,
wholly at the expense of the national government.
This diffusion of costs across jurisdictions led to high rates of
ill-health retirement of police ofﬁcers in general, coupled with wide-
spread variations in rates across police forces. For police ofﬁcers, the
incentive to utilise ill-health retirement as a workforce management
tool was exacerbated by the unique peculiarity of the police ofﬁcer's
terms of employment, under which a police ofﬁcer cannot be made
redundant before the ﬁrst age at which he or she could normally
retire (i.e. age 50).4 The discrepancy between the incidence of
perceived local beneﬁts and national costs arising from discretionary
retirement was noted by the central government and in 2006, among
the reforms to the police pension plan, a cost-sharing policy was
introduced by which part of the cost of ill-health retirement would
be borne by the local employer and indirectly, therefore, by the
local taxpayer. The implications of this speciﬁc policy change are
discussed later in the paper.
The paper is therefore structured as follows. The next section
provides a brief background on institutions, and on pension and re-
tirement policies in the police service, including ill-health retirement.
It then examines the effect of the various reforms on overall liabilities
of the police pension plan. To do this, a simulation model of the police
pension plan as it existed prior to 2006 is constructed for a represen-
tative cohort of police ofﬁcers, benchmarked on parameters obtained
from a variety of ofﬁcial sources, on which we simulate the various
reforms. The model is described brieﬂy in the text; a fuller description
is provided in an online appendix to this article.
Section 3 shows that the overall package of reforms introduced in
2006 will, in steady-state, reduce discounted pension liabilities of the
police pension plan by around 23%, with the bulk of the incidence of
this reduction born by police ofﬁcers; the national government
(and future national taxpayers) is thereby beneﬁciary. We provide3 The term ‘nationwide’ in the United Kingdom takes account of the distinct arrange-
ments for the four nations of the UK: England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
‘Local’ jurisdictions in the UK are counties or large metropolitan areas such as Greater
London and Merseyside. In what follows, we compare the ‘national’ level (of England
and Wales, which have identical arrangements) with the ‘local’ level of counties or
large metropolitan areas i.e. the second and third tiers of the UK's jurisdictional disag-
gregation. Our discussion of ‘national’ v ‘county or metropolitan area’ in the UK paral-
lels to a great extent the US's distinction between ‘state level’ and ‘county or city level’
jurisdictions.
4 It should be noted, however, that high rates of ill-health retirement were also ob-
served in the late 1990s among other groups such as ﬁreﬁghters and ambulance crews
even though such workforces had conventional employment contracts: see Treasury
(2000), Table 2.tentative evidence of the effect of the even more substantial reform
to police pensions which is planned to be introduced in 2015, gener-
ating not only larger gains to national taxpayers but also within a
shorter time span.
Section 4 focuses on the ill-health retirement component of the
2006 reform. We show that it accounts for a very small fraction of
this reduction in long-term liabilities. We estimate that the reform
increased the average working tenure (reduced the length of retire-
ment) by around half a year largely bringing high ill-health retire-
ment rates in a minority of forces into line with the average.5
However, given the very gradual transition to the other new features
of the police pension plan, only these changes to ill-health retirement
provisions have any immediate impact on pension liabilities.
Finally, we take account of the cost-sharing component of the ill-
health retirement reform. The effect of the reform on early retirement
rates will be ameliorated to the extent that local police authorities can
increase local taxes to offset the reduction in central government
support for ill-health retirements. Using econometric methods, we
show that the tax-raising capacity of local police authorities varies
widely, and that controlling for variations in the elasticity of tax
revenues to property tax rates, local taxes are higher in jurisdictions
where ill-health retirement rates are higher under the post-2006
cost-sharing regime. The incidence of this component of the reform
is therefore more complicated than other components: there is a
small shift of costs from the national government (taxpayers) to
police ofﬁcers through the reduction in early retirement in some police
forces, but amore signiﬁcant potential long-run shift from national tax-
payers to local taxpayers through the introduction of a cost-sharing
mechanism for ill-health retirement.2. Background
2.1. Institutions
All policing in England and Wales is carried out at the local level by
43 territorial police forces. Forces are normally organised at the county
level, albeit with some county forces merged into larger ‘territorial
areas’ (e.g. ‘Thames Valley’) or ‘joint forces’ covering larger municipal
areas such as Greater Manchester and, for most of London, the Metro-
politan Police. A typical police force in England andWales covers a pop-
ulation of around 1 million people, although the joint forces typically
cover larger populations and, in the case of the Metropolitan Police,
over 10 million people.6
Despite the decentralised territorial nature of policing in England
and Wales, all police ofﬁcers, irrespective of rank, are appointed to
the national ‘Ofﬁce of Constable’ – a procedure dating back to the
year 1066 (but more mundanely enshrined in the Police Acts of
1964 and 1996) – by which an ofﬁcer is sworn into the ofﬁce by
their local police force and thereby gains powers of search and arrest
that are not available to the general public including, under certain
conditions, the power to arrest outside their own territorial area.
Police ofﬁcers therefore do not have an ‘employment contract’ with
an individual police force, and thereby lack certain standard employ-
ment ‘rights’ such as the right to form a trade union and take industrial
action. Equally, except under certain very speciﬁc conditions, a police
ofﬁcer cannot be made redundant, and will continue in the ‘ofﬁce of
constable’ (irrespective of actual rank) until he or she cannot undertake
the full variety of tasks – both physical and mental – required by their
ofﬁce. For that reason, the age of ‘normal’ retirement for a police ofﬁcer5 A considerably greater increase in working tenure (reduction in retirement tenure)
is involved, of course, for those who would have taken ill-health retirement.
6 ‘Nationwide’ police activities, such as homeland security, serious crime, fraud etc.
are devolved to specialised units in some of these forces, notably the Metropolitan
Police. As is apparent a ‘county’ in England and Wales is typically a larger territorial
jurisdiction in terms of population than a county in the United States.
8 Even allowing for the higher contribution rate levied on police ofﬁcers than in other
public pension plans: see Pensions Policy Institute (2008). Nor is there evidence of lower
life expectancy among police ofﬁcers than the general population as a justiﬁcation for
lower pension age: see Government Actuary's Department (2011).
9 By way of comparison, average medical retirement rates in the same period among
ﬁreﬁghters were 68%, among teachers, 25%, and in the armed forces 6%. Private sector
rates (for those companies with pension plans with similar provisions) typically averaged
around 10%. See HM Treasury (2000), Table 2 and Fig. 3.
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age 50 or after 30 years of service.
2.2. Pay and pensions
In contrast also to the United States, the determination of police
remuneration in the UK has become increasingly centralised over
time. At the turn of the twentieth century – when there were many
more local police forces in the UK – pay was set locally. However in
1918 a 50% central exchequer grant was introduced to supplement
ﬁnance of police forces from local property taxes, and local police
authorities were required to place their police forces on one of two
pay scales which were subsequently broadly consolidated into a single
scale in 1962 (albeit with additional allowances especially within
the (London) Metropolitan Police). Police pay (and increases thereof)
is now set through a national statutory negotiating framework for
changes to pay and conditions. Proposed reforms to police pay and
conditions (such as Winsor, 2011, 2012), are also dealt with through
this negotiating machinery.7
Pension provisions of the police are as follows. Most current police
ofﬁcers – both active and retired – are members of the Police Pension
Scheme (PPS), which is a national unfunded contributory ﬁnal salary
deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan dating from 1987, although key princi-
ples of the scheme date back to 1921 and to subsequent legislation.
Since April 2006, this scheme has been closed to new members, and
new entrants to the police force are offered membership of the New
Police Pension Scheme (NPPS), introduced as part of the reform pro-
cess to public pensions initiated in the early 2000s (see Pensions
Policy Institute, 2008).
More recent changes in police pension arrangements should also be
noted. First, in line with changes to all public sector pension plans pro-
posed by HM Treasury (2011a), the government has raised employee
contributions to both the PPS and the NPPS and changed the method
of indexation of pensions in payment. Second, proposals stemming
from both HM Treasury (2011a) and Winsor (2012) have led to a
major police pension reformannounced in late 2012 to be implemented
in 2015. This reformwill raise normal pension age to 60 for serving po-
lice ofﬁcers in 2015 and also shift the pension calculation to a revalued
career-average rather than ﬁnal salary basis. These changes will take
place immediately for all new accruals by serving police ofﬁcers bar
those within a 10 year ‘window’ of the normal pension age; however
accrued rights are retained under the old formulae. This is in contrast
to the NPPS reform, which only applied to new entrants to the police
service. The main characteristics of the PPS, NPPS and the 2012 reform
framework, are summarised in Table 1.
Finally, it should be noted that the average age at which police
ofﬁcers enter the service has tended to rise over the last few years, not
least because of the excess supply of applicants and potential recruits.
This has allowed forces to recruit candidates with greater experience
(including experience in police staff roles) and enhanced educational
qualiﬁcations. According to the NPIA (2010), the average age of success-
ful police applicants at national assessment was almost 27 years; long
gone are the days when a new entrant to the police service joined from
left school at age 18, or even earlier.
2.3. Management of police retirement
As shown in Table 1, normal retirement for police ofﬁcers entering
the police service before 2006 can currently take place after 30 years
service or at age 50, with a retirement pension of up to two thirds of
ﬁnal salary. Both the 2006 reform (for new entrants) and the proposed7 There are recent moves away from the long process of centralisation of police ﬁ-
nances and remuneration in England and Wales: for example, newly elected police com-
missioners from November 2012 have been given greater discretion over how police
budgets are allocated across tasks.2015 reform (for all ofﬁcers who are more than 10 years away from
their existing date of normal retirement) increase these normal
pension ages, although they are still below those in most other public
sector pension plans.
Although the existing terms are generally regarded as among
the most generous on offer in public sector pension plans, especially
in terms of normal retirement date,8 police forces have also been
characterised by high levels of early retirement on grounds of ill-
health, especially in the late 1990s when medical retirements were
averaging almost half of all retirement across police forces (Treasury,
2000).9 Ill-health retirement rates across forces varied from less than
20% of all retirements to over 75% in the same period; the high rates
being seen as arising from a combination of generous enhancement
provisions (Treasury, 2000, Tables 1 and 2) and weak enforcement
and monitoring of medical claims by individual police forces (Poole,
1997). Ill-health retirement rates have fallen since that time, partly
due to tighter monitoring and to an increased willingness of forces to
place ofﬁcers on ‘restricted duties’.10 There is no continuous time series
available for the period from the late 1990s through to the present but,
as a benchmark, the average annual ill-health retirement rate of ofﬁcers
in the late 1990s was around 12 per 1000 (Treasury, 2000), being
halved by the early 2000s to around 6 per 1000 and falling again to
around 2 per 1000 by the end of the period under consideration here.
There are two incentives for police ofﬁcers to retire on grounds of
ill-health, subject of course to the loss of welfare associated with the
ill-health itself. First, ofﬁcers can receive a pension before their nor-
mal date of retirement (30 years' service or the earliest pension
age); second, because the ill-health pension is normally enhanced
by notional additional years of service. The conditions that determine
ill-health retirement for ofﬁcers are underpinned by police regula-
tions. An individual may be required to retire on medical grounds if
he or she is permanently disabled; for police ofﬁcers this is deﬁned as:
“disabled from performing the normal duties of a police ofﬁcer,
including operational duties, until compulsory retirement age…”
The criterion for ill-health retirement among police ofﬁcers there-
fore stresses the ofﬁcer's inability to perform ‘operational duties’ —
that is, limits on his or her potential full deployability such as in
major public order situations and other physically and mentally
stressful situations. This is a weaker criterion of ‘disability’ than in
most public social insurance settings where ‘disability’ would be
deﬁned by reference to incapacity in any employment or to a speciﬁc
set of disabling health conditions. In the context of police ofﬁcers, this
deﬁnition relating to ‘full deployability’ links back to the supposed
omnicompetence associated with the ‘Ofﬁce of Constable’. Conse-
quently, many police ofﬁcers who were unable to fulﬁl speciﬁc duties
obtained full ill-health retirement even though they were perfectly
capable of engaging in restricted activities.
Historically, as noted by Poole (1997) and others, assessment proce-
dures for ill-health retirement differed widely across police forces. In
some cases, ill-health assessments would be made on an initial
recommendation from a local line manager and/or evidence from the
applicant's doctor coupled with an in-house medical assessment,10 Ofﬁcers on ‘restricted duties’ are constrained in the operational duties that they
can undertake: see Winsor (2011) pp. 201ff. There is no reduction in pay from being
on ‘restricted duties’: Winsor (2012), Chapter 5, recommended that such ofﬁcers
should receive a pay reduction equivalent to the ‘premium’ in police ofﬁcer pay arising
from capability of full deployability.
Table 1
Summary of police pension plans and reforms.
Pension plans Police Pension Scheme (PPS) 1987 New Police Pension Scheme (NPPS) 2006 ‘Reform Design Framework’ 2012
Eligibility Joined force up to 05-04-06 Joined force from 06-04-06 All ofﬁcers but transition provisions
Employee contribution rate 11% of salary 9.5% of salary 13.7% of salary
Maximum pension 2/3 ﬁnal salary 1/2 ﬁnal salary + 4 × lump sum Career average revalued at CPI + 1.25%pa
Accrual rate 1/60th 20 years + 1/30th after
20 years
1/70th 1/55.3th
Maximum service full pension 30 years 35 years No cap
Earliest pension 48.5 (as early as 46 if transferred i
n service); deferred 60
55; deferred 65 Normal age 60 with transition provisions; 55 early
retirement with actuarial reduction; deferred SPA
Indexation of pension Was to RPI (2010 onwards to CPI) Was to RPI (2010 onwards to CPI) CPI
Survivor's pension 50% of member's pension 50% of member's pension 50% of member's pension
Ill-health beneﬁt One level of beneﬁt Two tier beneﬁt based on severity Two tier beneﬁt based on severity
Notes: RPI = retail price index; CPI = consumer price index, SPA = state pension age (currently 65 for men, 62 for women, rising for both sexes to 66 by 2020 and 68 by 2046).
Under the UK provisions, pension lump sums are generally treated by the tax systemmore favourably than annuities (pensions) up to a ceiling, therefore commutation to lump sum
payments is generally favoured; in PPS and 2012 reform, therefore, police ofﬁcers could also have part of the pension taken as a lump sum (as in other pension plans). The 2012
contribution rate is an average weighted across bands of earnings. The increase in contribution rates in 2012 for those in the 2006 PPS is lower than those cited here.
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medical assessments and more detailed consideration of alternative
employment in the police service. Moreover, as noted by HM Treasury
(2000), the police formula for ill-health retirement pension awards pro-
vides enhancement of years of service according to a non-linear formula
depending on existing numbers of years' service. There are distinct
‘spikes’ in awards at those years of service at which the rate of enhance-
ment increases, such as after 10 and 13 years' service. This suggests that
ﬁnancial incentives, aswell asmedical issues, played amajor part in the
process. Consequently, after the mid-2000s, efforts were made to im-
plement standardised ‘best practice’ medical assessment procedures
across forces.
2.4. The 2006 reforms to police retirement
As noted in Table 1, in 2006 new entrants among police ofﬁcers
were enrolled in the New Police Pension Scheme (NPPS). In respect
of conditions of service, there was one important result of the reform:
the NPPS distinguishes ofﬁcers who are incapable of employment in
general from those capable of regular employment elsewhere. In the
2006 scheme, the latter receive only an unenhanced pension. This
change makes a sizeable difference to pension payouts in simulatedTable 2
Reductions in police pension liabilities arising from various reforms.
Results PPS
IHRR0 IHRR12 I
Ill health retirement per 1000
ofﬁcers
0 12 6
Accrual rate 1/60th
(2/60th after 20 years)
1/60th
(2/60th after 20 years)
1
(
Gross average pension liability
per ofﬁcer (£)
370,585 358,908 3
Net average pension liability
per ofﬁcer (£)
296,252 291,434 2
Intake needed for force size
of 120,000
5844 6335 6
Gross pension liability of forces
(£ billion)
2.17 2.27 2
(%+/− from previous column) – +5.0% −
Net pension liability of forces
(£ billion)
1.73 1.85 1
(%+/− from previous column) – +6.6% −
Notes: All values discounted to age of entry at 2% per annum, at constant prices and 2012 p
IHHRX = Assumed Ill health retirement rate per 1000 ofﬁcers. PPS = Police Pension Schem
‘Average pension liability per ofﬁcer’ × ‘Intake needed’ gives ‘Pension liability of forces’. ‘Necases (Winsor, 2012, pp. 281–2); however most serving police ofﬁcers
are still covered by the earlier pension scheme which makes no such
distinction.
In addition to this change in incentives, Home Ofﬁce (2005) sets a
new current target maximum level of ill-health retirements of 6.5 per
1000 ofﬁcers in service for every police force. Although there were no
directﬁnancial penalties as such for failing to achieve this target, each po-
lice force as a whole received a series of performance targets, of which
this was one, and failure to achieve these targets could invite pressure
from the central government and local police authorities on senior police
ofﬁcers, particularly Chief Constables, who are often appointed on limit-
ed tenures, tomatch up or leave. Finally, a newcost-sharing arrangement
was introduced, which is discussed further in Section 4. Combining these
changes, therefore, it can be seen that the central government, in the
form of the Home Ofﬁce, signiﬁcantly altered the incentives to local
police forces in relation to ill-health retirement.
3. Impact of pension reform on pension liabilities
We investigate the impact of these various reforms on overall (gross)
police pension liabilities, and the incidence among various interest
groups. Unfortunately, no existing sources provide comprehensiveNPPS 2012 Reform
HHR6 IHRR2 IHRR2 IHRR2
2 2 2
/60th
2/60th after 20 years)
1/60th
(2/60th after 20 years)
1/70th + 4 ×
lump sum
1/55.3 career
average
64,523 368,669 324,377 256,524
93,669 295,514 250,390 136,138
084 5923 5290 4909
.22 2.18 1.72 1.26
2.5% −1.5% −21.4% −26.6%
|{z}
−22.6%
.79 1.75 1.32 0.67
3.2% −2.0% −24.3% −49.5%
|{z}
−25.8%
arameter values. For construction of values: see text.
e (1987); NPPS = New Police Pension Scheme (2006).
t’ excludes employee contributions.
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constructed a simulation model of the police pension plan to obtain
some magnitudes for the various components of the reform package.
Our simulation model is a representative agent model. The agent
joins the police force in the ﬁrst period with certain demographic
characteristics (age and sex). Each subsequent year is then modelled
in turn, with the agent able to take one of 5 possible states: working
in the police force, withdrawn from the police force with retained
rights in the police pension scheme, retired from the police force
and drawing a pension, retired from the police force on ill-health
grounds and drawing a (potentially enhanced) pension, or dead.
The transitions between these states are governed by assumed
probabilities derived from various sources but primarily Government
Actuary's Department (2009); data in turn based on detailed member-
ship data of the PPS as of March 2003 which are not publically avail-
able. Earnings progression over the lifetime depends on pay scales,
probability of promotion, and assumed real earnings growth derived
from external pay uplifts. The pay scales are derived from Winsor
(2011); the promotion probabilities are calculated by the authors
such as to give a distribution of ranks consistent with the Home Ofﬁce
data and with promotion procedures as described in Winsor (2011);
the real pay uplift is assumed to be 2% per annum.
There are two aspects to the retirement modelling in the simula-
tion. First, ‘normal’ retirement allows the individual to retire either
at the ﬁrst age permitted (e.g. age 50 in the Police Pension Scheme)
or when the individual has acquired a certain number of years' contri-
butions (see Table 1). We assume a plausible allocation of retirees be-
tween these exit strategies in the PPS. Second, we simulate ill-health
retirement using the distribution of ill-health retirement rates by
tenure, obtained from HM Treasury (2000) Chart 2. We simply
assume that changing levels of ill-health retirement rates over time
and across police forces involve scaling these tenure distributions of
retirement rates proportionally. To compute the enhancement of
pension beneﬁts arising from early ill-health retirement we apply
the non-linear enhancement rules described in HM Treasury (2000),
Table 1.
The ﬁnal step is to compute the overall liability to the police
pension plan. For the representative agent, this is calculated as the
sum of the stream of pension income that an individual receives in
retirement, discounted back to the year at which the individual
joins the force at a real rate of 2% per annum. This gives the gross pen-
sion liability per individual. We then estimate the sum of employee
contributions based on the contribution rate speciﬁc to each pension
scheme and deduct this from the gross stream. This gives the net
liability to the government (taxpayer) per individual. These are
predominantly national taxpayers given the current ﬁnancing of the
pension plans, but we discuss the implications of the cost-sharing
reform introduced for new ill-health retirements after 2006 in the
next section.
The model is simulated 10,000 times to compute an average
discounted pension liability arising from a representative agent
given the assumptions of the model. The distribution of demographic
characteristics on enlisting is weighted to reﬂect the proﬁle of
entrants to the police force described in Government Actuary's
Department (2009). The entry rate is weighted such that a steady
state police force of 120,000 is obtained; this has the interesting fea-
ture that an indirect cost of early retirement is that more ofﬁcers have
to be hired (and, of course, accrue pension entitlements) where there
are provisions to retire earlier within the pension plan. This computa-
tion is then done for alternative average rates of ill-health retirement,
to capture the different average levels of retirement prevailing in the
late 1990s, the early 2000s and after the 2006 reform, and then for the
changes to the other parameters of the pension plan arising from the
introduction of the New Police Pension Scheme in 2006 and the new
framework as proposed in Table 1. The assumptions, methods, and
sensitivity analyses are available in the online appendix.3.1. Impact on pension liabilities: the results
Table 2 describes the key results of the simulation model. The ﬁrst
column simulates the Police Pension Scheme without any ill-health
retirement, computing the total liability of this cohort and the num-
ber of entrants needed to generate a steady-state police force of
120,000. It is not straightforward to compare the total liability with
the PBO values described in the introduction to this article for two
reasons. First, the PBO is the sum of projected rights of a snapshot
of employees, retired pensioners and deferred rights at a point in
time, incorporating future salary increases but holding ﬁxed current
levels of service, whereas our calculation is a present value of all
expected beneﬁts (net and gross of employee contributions) for a
representative cohort. Second, we have no way of knowing whether
and how ill-health retirement is built into the aggregate PBO ﬁgure.
Nevertheless, it can be seen from our calculations that if the dis-
counted rights of one cohort or ‘generation’ of police ofﬁcers total
around £2.2 billion, then the aggregate liability will depend on the
number of cohorts alive at any one time and the stage of the
life-cycle at which they observed.
Table 2 then shows that an ill-health retirement rate of 12 per 1000
ofﬁcers – the rate prevailing in the late 1990s – using the tenure inci-
dence of ill-health retirement of HM Treasury (2000), increases the
discounted pension liabilities by 5%; for this single cohort, by around
£100 million. It also increases the average tenure of retirement
(reduces the tenure of employment as a police ofﬁcer) by around one
and a half years. This does not simply arise from the shorter employ-
ment histories impacting on pension costs for a given individual, but
because more police ofﬁcers need to be employed to achieve a target
employment level. The reduction in ill-health retirement in the early
2000s reduces this value of liabilities by 2.5%; the reduction observed
around the time of the 2006 reforms analysed here by a further 1.5%.
Our best estimate of the effect of the reforms in the next section sug-
gests that little of this last reduction can be attributable to the reforms
themselves— althoughwe ﬁnd evidence that reductions of this magni-
tude were achieved in those forces with signiﬁcantly higher-than-
average ill-health retirement rates for which the reduction in ill-
health retirement in this period reduced average retirement tenure
by just under 6 months.
The other columns of Table 2 are our calculations of the total
savings both from the remainder of the 2006 reform package and
the subsequent 2012 reforms. In steady state, combining the 2006 re-
forms to accrual rates, pension age and ill-health retirement reduces
discounted pension liabilities by nearly a quarter. This is a large
number, but it needs reiterating that only the ill-health retirement
rate reduction occurs ‘up front’ given that the reform only applies to
new entrants to the police forces. The limited nature of this reform,
which delayed any major change until long in the future, plus the be-
lief that the normal age of retirement was still too low, precipitated
the 2012 reforms which reduce the value of pension liabilities still
further. These reforms will kick in more quickly because they apply
to all serving police ofﬁcers, but accrued rights are preserved under
the existing plans and, moreover, there is a ten year basic ‘window,
plus other concessions, by which those nearing retirement are
exempt from these reforms. Moreover, they are particularly sensitive
to the discount rate chosen, not least because of the signiﬁcantly
higher level of contributions.
Finally, the incidence of these reforms can be examined. The broad
effect of the reforms is to reduce the liabilities that accrue to national
taxpayers. The difference between the changes in the gross and net
liabilities illustrates the differential effects of changing contributions
and lower beneﬁts – despite the lower contribution rates in the
2006 reform, these are outweighed by the reduction in beneﬁts –
whilst the 2012 reform unequivocably hits contributing police ofﬁ-
cers. Note, again, the intergenerational implications of the reforms,
with only new entrants affected by the bulk of the 2006 provisions,
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Fig. 2. Differences of ill-health retirement rates (IHRRs) from average, 2002–03 to
2005-06. Estimated by regression of police area ﬁxed effects on IHRRs for the period.
Dark shaded bars are those signiﬁcantly positive at 1% or 5% level.
Source: as Fig. 1, various years.
67R. Crawford, R. Disney / Journal of Public Economics 116 (2014) 62–72with the 2012 changes shifting the incidence forward to existing
members who are more than ten years from normal pension age.
4. The reforms to ill-health retirement
This section examines three issues. First, what factors underlie the
variation in ill-health retirement rates across police forces? Second, how
did the 2006 reforms impact on the level of ill-health retirement— both
through targeting of high-rate forces (as described in Section 2) and the
introduction of a cost-sharing mechanism (to be described shortly)?
Finally, what are the implications of cost-sharing in the post-2006 peri-
od given the differential capacities of police authorities to raise local
property taxes?
4.1. Determinants of ill-health retirement; impact of 2006 reform
The reforms to the ill-health retirement regime described in
Section 2 were predicated on the assumption that persistent varia-
tions in retirement rates across police forces arose in large part from
inadequate workforce management and lax assessment of disability
in a sub-set of forces. These factors could be susceptible to reforms
introduced at the national level. However, in modelling ill-health
retirement, we should take account of other factors: ofﬁcers in some
forces face disproportionately stressful environments with an associat-
ed persistent higher incidence of ill-health. We also need to check that
variations in ill-health retirement rates from year to year are not wholly
random such that any statistical effects of a reform on retirement rates
are essentially spurious. We investigate both these possibilities.
To set the scene, Fig. 1 graphs the distribution of ill-health retire-
ment rates across police force in England and Wales for ﬁscal year
2005–06, just before the various reforms to the retirement regime
described in the previous section were implemented. The range of
ill-health retirement rates is large in Fig. 1, but this may reﬂect tran-
sitory circumstances across police forces, especially among smaller
forces where the numerator of the ratio is relatively small. To handle
this transitory aspect, Fig. 2 uses panel data on ill-health retirement
rates by police force to examine which police forces have systemati-
cally higher (or lower) rates than the average for the period 2002–
03 to 2005–06. Running a simple ﬁxed effects police force-level
regression to control for year-on-year variability demonstrates that
there are several police forces with statistically signiﬁcantly higher
ill-health retirement rates than the average over that period (those
with signiﬁcant coefﬁcients at 5% or above are indicated by the darker
bars in Fig. 2).
Given these systematic disparities in ill-health retirement rates,
we use reduced form econometric models to examine factors under-
lying differences in ill-health retirement rates and also the impact of0
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Fig. 1. Ill-health retirement rates by police force, England and Wales, 2005–2006.
Source: Home Ofﬁce returns and CIPFA Police Actuals 2005–06.the 2006 reforms on retirement rates on 42 police forces in England
and Wales over the period 2002–03 to 2009–10.11 The dependent
variable is the (ill-health retirement rate per 1000 police ofﬁcers)it
for the ith police force at time t. This rate is assumed to depend on
several factors:4.1.1. Characteristics of police ofﬁcers
Ill-health may correlate with personal characteristics such as age,
gender, ethnicity and underlying health. Given that we are working
with force-level data rather than individual data, this implies that
forces with, for example, a higher proportion of older police ofﬁcers
might have a higher incidence of ill-health. In this data set, evidence
on force-level characteristics is limited, and we use normal retire-
ments per 1000 ofﬁcers as a proxy for age structure, since there is
clearly a strong correlation between having older police ofﬁcers and
the incidence of normal retirement through the pension scheme.124.1.2. Stress and intensity of work across police forces
Police ofﬁcers working in more stressful settings (for example,
inner city areas) may face higher levels of risk of disability and
ill-health. Several variables are used to proxy aspects of local policing,
mostly taken from CIPFA (2011) and from Ofﬁce of National Statistics
data. The covariates utilised are: the local crime rate: number of noti-
ﬁed offences per 1000 population; population density per ofﬁce as a
proxy for operating in urban areas; local crime clear-up rate as % of
recorded offences to capture any residual intensity of policing;
local area unemployment rate, using Ofﬁce of National Statistics data
matched into police areas; and local area wage relative to the average
wage for England and Wales, obtained by mapping data from the
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) to police authority
areas, the last two variables assumed to reﬂect differences in relative
deprivation across police areas.13 We note that the measured effects
of these last two variables may be confounded by a degree of11 We exclude the (small) police force of ‘City of London’ from among the 43 England
and Wales forces as we have no local area control variables.
12 Measures of the health status of police ofﬁcers would obviously be good predictors
of ill-health and therefore, presumably, ill-health retirement. However Winsor (2012)
noted: “The physical ﬁtness of police ofﬁcers, and some staff, are tested as part of the
recruitment and probation process but, unless they undertake certain specialist roles,
never again thereafter” (Winsor, 2012, p.211). Extraordinarily, no data derived from
ﬁtness or health tests on police ofﬁcers therefore exist.
13 It should be noted that ASHE data are the most comprehensive sources of earnings
data in England and Wales, being a 1% survey of social insurance contribution records,
but that ONS applies some caveats to the employment weightings. The matching uses
local authority employment weights to aggregate the pay data into police force areas.
Table 3
Modelling ill-health retirement rates across police forces.
Explanatory variables (1) Deﬁnition 1 (2) Deﬁnition 2
Employee characteristics
Normal retirements per 1000 ofﬁcers 0.04 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02)
Stress factors
Crime rate (notiﬁed offences per 1000
population)
0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Clear-up rate (per cent of recorded
offences)
0.04 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04)
Population per ofﬁcer 0.02* (0.01) 0.02* (0.01)
Local area unemployment rate (%) 0.41* (0.18) 0.46* (0.18)
Local area wage relative to average
wage (%)
−4.11 (2.79) −3.73 (2.77)
Time trend −1.09*** (0.16) −1.11*** (0.16)
Time trend × post-2006 0.35*** (0.10) 0.36*** (0.10)
Time trend × post-2006 × “high”
IHR force
−0.33** (0.10) −0.45*** (0.12)
Force dummies Yes Yes
R2 0.7893 0.7930
Number of observations 336 336
F = (.) F(50, 286) = 26.18 F(50, 286) = 26.74
Notes: ‘deﬁnitions’ and variables as deﬁned in text. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels from a 1-sided test.
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ings on the outside options available to retiring police ofﬁcers.14
4.1.3. Police force early retirement policy
As already described, police forces have differed widely in their
monitoring of ill-health and disability claims and therefore in their
levels of ill-health retirement. We proxy this by a police force area
dummy variable.
4.1.4. Policy changes
These involve the policy changes introduced in 2006 and described
in the previous section. Ill-health is trended downwards from the late
1990s, so we utilise a trend in the speciﬁcation but allow this trend
to diverge between ‘high’ ill-health retirement rate and other forces
after the policy intervention.15 We utilise two deﬁnitions of ‘high
ill-health retirement rate’ forces, one based on ‘observables’ and one
based on our own method of identiﬁcation:
Deﬁnition 1: those forces which had an ill-health retirement rate in
excess of 6.5 per 1000 in any ﬁnancial year in the period from
2003–04 to 2005–06.
Deﬁnition 2: those forces which have a signiﬁcant above average
ill-health retirement rate pre-2006–07 (i.e. those with a positive
and signiﬁcant ﬁxed effect as depicted in Fig. 2).
The results of this exercise are described in Table 3. It shows an
insigniﬁcant association of ill-health retirement rates with age struc-
ture as proxied by the rate of ordinary retirements. However, we
might not anticipate strong associations in the data between personal
characteristics and ill-health retirement, except perhaps with under-
lying measures of health status that are not available for the reasons
described earlier (see footnote 12).
Local variations in ‘stressfulness’ of policing are a more promising
avenue and indeed there is statistical evidence that variation over
forces and time in some of these indicators is correlated with
ill-health retirement rates: in particular there is a signiﬁcant positive
association with population density and with high unemployment as
predicted a priori. There is therefore evidence that variations in
ill-health retirement rates across forces are not simply the result of
lax administrative procedures in relation to the monitoring of poor
health and disability in some forces.
Variations in stress of policing are not, however, the whole story
as demonstrated when wemodel the policy reforms. Table 3, columns
(1) and (2) conﬁrm that the data are consistent with a negative time
trend of 1 in 1000 per year over this period (but see the discussion in
footnote 15). We focus on the coefﬁcient on the interaction terms of
the trend post-2006 with our two measures of pre-2006 ‘high
ill-health retirement rate force’. Although Deﬁnition 1 is an easily
observable measure to central authorities, it is contaminated by year-
on-year variance in rates of ill-health retirement, and we prefer Deﬁni-
tion 2 as characterising forces with persistent and statistically signiﬁcant14 Given that police wage rates are set nationally, the relative wage variable also effec-
tively captures the ratio of local wages to local police wages. The mapping of local earn-
ings into local police earnings across police forces is illustrated graphically in Winsor
(2012) Volume 2, Appendix 3, pp. 686–689. A correlation matrix of the variables used
in the present analysis is given in Crawford and Disney (2012).
15 Inspection of the two (non-overlapping) series of aggregate data from HM Treasury
(2000) and the aggregate of the police force data available to use from 2002–03 to
2009–10 suggests that a downward trend is a plausible assumption over the longer peri-
od, although a linear trend of course could not be used for future out-of-sample predic-
tions – indeed post-2006–07 there is no discernible downward trend in the data.
Within our data period from 2002 to 2003 onwards, there is a particularly sharp fall in
ill-health retirements between 2002–03 and 2003–04 which does not appear to be
explained by any speciﬁc policy. Average ill-health retirements in the post reform period
2006–07 onwards are 38% lower than the pre-2006 average when 2002–03 is included,
and 23% lower when 2002–03 is excluded, in our data window. For this reason we are
very cautious in interpreting any aggregate effect of the policy reform and so we focus
on the impact only on ‘high’ ill-health retirement forces.above-average ill-health retirement rates in the pre-2006 period. The
difference between the interactions suggests that the reform reduced
the ill-health retirement rates of the ‘high’ forces by around 3 per
1000 more than in other forces in the period under consideration.
This gives a reduction in total pension liabilities for these forces alone
of just under the percentage reductions in Table 2 when comparing
the adjacent columns labelled ‘IHRR6’ and ‘IHRR2’. The impact on the
overall pension liabilities across all forces is, of course, considerably
smaller.
At ﬁrst sight, therefore, these results suggest a continued trend rate
of decline of ill-health retirement among the ‘high’ ill-health retire-
ment forces even though the rate of decline slowed signiﬁcantly in
other forces after the reforms were implemented. Both the continued
decline in ill-health retirement in the ‘average’ force and the faster-
than-average decline in the ‘high rate’ forces post-2006 might be
attributable to the policy but it is also possible, especially using Deﬁni-
tion 1 of the ‘high ill-health retirement rate forces’, that there is some
degree of ‘regression to the mean’ taking place in the dispersion of
retirement rates over time. We therefore undertook placebo tests
which shifted the structural break from 2006–07 to other years — if
the coefﬁcient was equally signiﬁcant, it suggests that we are more
likely to be observing a statistical process than a policy-driven process.
To summarise the results of this sensitivity analysis, we cannot rule out
that the shift among high retirement rate forces took place as early as
2004–05— though no later than 2006–07.16 This may derive from a re-
sponse to early indications of the imminent policy change (Home
Ofﬁce, 2004, Annex B) or simply suggest that, in our relatively short
data window, we cannot separately identify policy effects from statisti-
cal processes with great precision.4.2. The introduction of cost-sharing for ill-health retirement
4.2.1. Background: ﬁnancing of the police in England and Wales
Another component of the 2006 reform may however have greater
long-term implications for ill-health retirement. This concerns a
change in the ﬁnancing arrangements for pensions. Under the pre-
2006 funding regime, all expenditures on police pensions, whether
via normal or ill-health retirement, were transferred from the central
government through the main central block grant to local police au-
thorities whilst contributions by serving police ofﬁcers to the police16 Results of these and other sensitivity tests are available on request from the authors.
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in other words, the central government effectively ﬁnanced all pension
payments net of employee contributions.
Under the arrangements from 2006 2007 onwards, each police
authority established a pension account into which employee and
employer contributions within that police force would be paid. This
would then be used to pay the pensions of both new and existing
retired police ofﬁcers. Given the large stock of retired police ofﬁcers
relative to serving police ofﬁcers, this account would generally be in
deﬁcit, and would be topped up by the central government to remain
in balance.17 Under the new proposals, this ‘top-up’would be done in
full for ‘normal’ retirements. However, for ill-health retirements, the
local police authority was required to pay an upfront charge of
twice the average pensionable pay for the ofﬁcer concerned into the
pension account, with the ongoing pension award being ﬁnanced
from contributions or by central government subsidy (Home Ofﬁce,
2005). For a realistic example, this would imply an upfront capital
charge on the new pension account of three or four times the new
pension award. For a plausible discount rate, and assuming life expec-
tancy of ill-health retirees to be somewhat less than life expectancy of
normal retirees, this upfront cost could constitute around one-ﬁfth of
the total projected pension cost over the remaining lifetime.18 This
capital charge on the local police authority would then have to be
ﬁnanced either from greater efﬁciency in spending the central grant
or by raising revenue from local property taxes to rectify the shortfall
in the pension account in relation to these retirements.
This shift in part of the burden of ill-health retirement onto local
police forces is not the only policy that might be envisaged. An alter-
native reform, of simply centralising all decisions concerning ill-
health retirement, seems to have been ruled out on the grounds
that ‘deployability’ and workforce management are the concerns of
local police forces rather than the national government. As in the
United States, the independence of police deployment and manage-
ment from national government intervention is regarded as one of
the bedrocks of political and jurisdictional independence. However
given the much greater involvement of the UK national governments
in the ﬁnancing of local police activities, the rebalancing of existing ﬁ-
nancial arrangements was arguably long overdue given the incentives
to transfer the costs of local discretionary retirement on to national
government as described in the introduction to this article. Hence
the taxable capacity of the local police authority becomes an issue
once a cost-sharing policy is implemented. The idea that the generos-
ity of components of public sector remuneration – whether in the
form of current or deferred pay – depends on local taxable capacity
has been the focus of a small but interesting published literature in
the United States on the topic, although it has not focused on retire-
ment provisions per se.19
To understand the implications of this change for particular police
forces, a brief explanation of police funding in England and Wales is
required. The largest bulk grant for policing for England and Wales
(accounting for, on average, 35% of police ﬁnding in 2010–11) comes
from the Home Ofﬁce through the Police Main (or block) grant which
is allocated by a complicated mechanism known as the Police Funding
Formula (PFF) (Home Ofﬁce, 2012), described more fully in Crawford17 Home Ofﬁce ﬁgures suggest that, in 2008, there were around 131,000 active mem-
bers of the 1987 PPS and 12,000 active members of the 2006 NPPS. There were 104,000
retired members of the 1987 PPS as well as deferred members and survivors of mem-
bers who were, or would, receive pensions.
18 The calculation assumes retirement on a pensionable income of £40,000 at age 50,
a pension of £24,000, a real discount rate of 2% and a life expectancy beyond retirement
date of around 25 years. This would of course understate the relative burden on the
pension account for those ofﬁcers who entered the police service later or who died
much earlier due to severe disablement.
19 The literature includes Inman (1982), Epple and Schipper (1981), Leeds (1985),
Gyourko and Tracy (1989, 1991) and Poterba and Rueben (1995).and Disney (2012).20 A further, 11% comes through speciﬁc grants for
particular activities and priorities (e.g. for ‘neighbourhood policing’
and for counter terrorism), and around 30% from the Department of
Communities and Local Government (DLCG) and the Welsh Assembly.
The remaining funds are raised locally, through a precept levied on
local residential properties.21
Although most ﬁnancing of police forces comes through block
grant funding provided by the national government, a signiﬁcant
component – varying from 12% to 45% of total budget across forces
in 2011 – is raised from local property taxes. The dominant source
of local ﬁnancing of police activities is the ‘precept’; levied as part of
Council Tax on local residential property. This tax was introduced in
1993 replacing previous property taxes, and allocates each residential
property to one of eight bands assessed in 1991 in England (2003 in
Wales) depending on the size of the property and other features.
Newly constructed properties are assigned a band and properties
with major reconstruction may be rebanded. Each local authority sets
a Council tax (and police precept rate) as an annual levy on a
middle-banded property (Band ‘D’); a nationally ﬁxed formula then
sets the rate of tax on each band as a ﬁxed multiple or fraction of
that levy. The tax base is therefore the number of ‘Band D-equivalised
properties’ and the revenue that can be collected by a local police
force from the precept depends on the total number and composition
of properties in the area times the rate of precept set by the local
police authority. It is therefore apparent that the elasticity of revenues
from changing the precept depends on this original banding assessment
of residential property in the area, as well as any new construction.
Note also that the multiple of banding rates from the lowest to the
highest band is much more limited than the range of property values
in any given area and, second, that house price increases (or falls) do
not per se increase property tax revenues since the formula relating
residential property type to band has remained ﬁxed since the incep-
tion of the Council Tax. Revenues rise when the rate of precept on
properties is increased, not because house values rise (other than
compositional effects arising from new builds and any rebanding
based on home improvements). Moreover, the central government
has at various times attempted to cap increases in the precept of
speciﬁc police forces if these are seen to be ‘excessive’.
Fig. 3 shows how the share of ﬁnancing raised from the local pre-
cept varies across local police forces in 2005–06. As we model shortly,
these differences partly depend on the nature of residential property,
but they also depend indirectly on the formula allocating central
grants, on any ‘capping’ procedures, and also on the expenditure
needs of individual police forces. Fig. 4 shows that revenue obtained
from local sources by police forces tended to increase recently as a
share of total income, especially in the ﬁrst part of the period. This in-
crease slowed in the second party of the period, in part reﬂecting
‘capped’ precept increases as part of a general attempt to limit Council
Tax increases by DCLG.4.2.2. Statistical analysis of local revenue-raising and ill-health retirement
In this ﬁnal section, we examine the determinants of the ‘precept’ —
the property tax which provides the locally-funded component of po-
lice funding. We show that the average real value of the precept levied
per property in general depends on area characteristics (notably the
quality and density of housing) and on the demand for police ofﬁcers'20 For further discussion, see Universities Police Science Institute (2011). This paper
remarks that the current government is committed to reforming and simplifying the
grant allocation procedure but notes that: ‘Such is its complexity it may even be be-
yond signiﬁcant change’ (Universities Police Science Institute, 2011, p. 3).
21 Small additional sums are raised locally from ﬁnes and fees, from some charges for
policing (e.g. for certain sports events) and, for individual police forces, from lending
police ofﬁcers to other forces (‘mutual aid’) or from revenue from the loan of specialist
units (e.g. underwater recovery teams) between forces. The DLCG is responsible for ﬁ-
nancing other local government activities in England; again with Council Tax and also
the ‘business rate’ as the main sources of local ﬁnance.
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70 R. Crawford, R. Disney / Journal of Public Economics 116 (2014) 62–72services. Our primary hypothesis is twofold: ﬁrst, that the level of
ill-health retirement should have no effect on the precept rate
pre-2006, since the costs of ill-health retirement were wholly covered
from central block grant funding in that period. This turns out to be the
case. Second, however, there is evidence of a positive relationship
post-2006, when police forces became responsible for part-funding
ill-health retirement of police ofﬁcers.
Our dependent variable is the real police precept levied per property
(in £) by each police authority in every year. In our reduced form
speciﬁcation, we assume that this variable is affected by a number
of factors that broadly affect the elasticity of the supply of funds
and the demand for policing. We test for any association with the
rate of ill-health retirement, primarily in the ﬁnancial year 2006–07
onwards, when local police authorities became responsible for
part-funding ill-health retirement. Summary statistics for both this
variable and the covariates are given in the appendix to Crawford
and Disney (2012).
The supply of funds is driven by the density and banding of
properties in the police authority area. We use two variables derived
from CIPFA data to capture this: the number of Band-D equivalent
properties and the size of the population.22 We predict that the coef-
ﬁcients on these variables will be of opposite sign and that, overall,
ability to raise funds is positively related to the ratio of properties
per head. We also test a proposition advanced by Glaeser and
Ponzetto (2012) in the context of public pensions. Since there are
several billing authorities for property taxes (which incorporate the
police precept) within each police authority area (because police au-
thorities are larger administrative units than local public authorities),
it may be argued that the link between local police services and the
level of precept is less transparent than it is for other public services;
hence the costs of the police service are partially ‘shrouded’ in multi-
ple jurisdictions.
The demand for additional funds for policing is driven by the type
of indicators described earlier in the context of ill-health retirement,
such as the reported crime rate, clear-up rate, and measures of local
deprivation. We also include the number of ofﬁcers in the local police
force. This variable is, strictly speaking, endogenous to a structural
model of the police precept (as is, potentially, the notiﬁed crime
rate). In our reduced form approach, this variable is present to
capture any differential local community preferences for hiring police
ofﬁcers over and above those provided for from central funding.
Table 4 describes the results from various speciﬁcations. These are
ﬁxed effect models with year dummies, with the inclusion of various22 To reiterate: the number of properties utilises a normalisation, like ‘equivalent in-
come’, by which higher (lower) value properties are treated as a multiple (fraction) of
average band properties in calculating the base. Thus an area with a high proportion of
high-banded properties will be treated as if it has many more properties per head than
a poorer neighbourhood with low banded residential housing (CIPFA, 2012).combinations of covariates. In general, the level of precept per
property is positively associated with the number of equivalised
properties and negatively associated with the size of the population,
though these results are sensitive to choice of covariates. The
‘shrouding’ variable – number of billing authorities – is correctly signed
but not signiﬁcant. In some speciﬁcations, our ‘demand’ variables are
also signiﬁcant, but the reduced form nature of the speciﬁcations limits
the interpretation. Clearly there is scope for fruitful further research on
a more structured model of local police funding.
In the present context, however, it is the last two variables that are of
primary interest. The ﬁrst is ‘ill health retirements per 1000 ofﬁcers’. This
has no effect on revenues raised locally over the period as a whole, as in-
deed should be the case since, until 2006, these retirements were wholly
ﬁnanced from central sources. However the interaction of this variable
with the post-2006 period is highly signiﬁcant, irrespective of the com-
bination of covariates. This is the period when local police authorities
did become partially responsible for the funding of ill-health retirement.
This result is strongly consistent with the idea that some authorities
were prepared to use their capacity to raise local precept in order to ﬁ-
nance higher rates of ill-health retirement, so offsetting in part the
curbs on such policies originating from the central government.23
Whilst this is an interesting result in the context of the present
paper, caution must be exercised before asserting that the higher pre-
cept simply paid for the higher ill-health retirement. This is because
the coefﬁcient implies that, at the mean, the amount of money raised
from the precept with each extra ill-health retirement signiﬁcantly
exceeded the direct costs of ﬁnancing that ill-health retirement for a
representative pension value. Even if we allow for ﬁxed costs of
replacement and training, the ﬁgure is probably at least double the
required sum. We would therefore suggest that this is an association
in the data — police authorities for which it was easier to raise precept
used the extra revenue for a number of activities including, inter alia, a
higher level of ill-health retirement.5. Conclusion
This paper has investigated the police pension reforms introduced in
recent times in England andWales. The reforms should be contextualised
by the somewhat different institutional features of police forces in23 The lack of signiﬁcance of ill-health retirement for the whole period is effectively a pla-
cebo test thatwe are not observing some overall spurious association between ill-health re-
tirement and precept per property. Among our sensitivity tests, we excluded the London
Metropolitan Police from the sample, since their scale of operations is so much larger than
any other police force – see the statistical appendix. This exclusion made no signiﬁcant dif-
ference to the ﬁndings – a result which is available on request from the authors.
Table 4
Modelling real police precept levied per property (£).
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3)
Number of Band D-equivalent
properties (000s)
0.59***
(0.08)
0.54***
(0.08)
0.04
(0.11)
Population (000s) −0.11***
(0.02)
−0.10***
(0.02)
−0.06**
(0.02)
Number of billing authorities
in police authority area
0.22 (1.08) 0.09
(1.12)
0.37
(1.02)
Local area unemployment
rate (%)
– 0.30
(1.54)
0.97
(1.44)
Local area wage relative
to average wage (%)
– −17.71
(39.88)
5.60
(36.78)
Number of ofﬁcers in force – – 0.02***
(0.00)
Crime rate (notiﬁed offences
per 1000 population)
– 0.04
(0.09)
0.26**
(0.09)
Clear-up rate (per cent
of recorded offences)
– – 0.34*
(0.17)
Ill health retirements
per 1000 ofﬁcers
−0.16
(0.37)
−0.18
(0.38)
−0.36
(0.35)
Interaction post-2006 × ill
health retirements
per 1000 ofﬁcers
1.21*
(0.51)
1.20*
(0.51)
1.28**
(0.47)
Force dummies
Year dummies
Adjusted R2
Yes
Yes
0.8896
Yes
Yes
0.8886
Yes
Yes
0.9061
Number of observations 334 334 334
F = (.) F(53, 280) =
51.61
F(56, 277) =
48.43
F(58, 275) =
56.38
Note: Variables as deﬁned in text. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels from a 1-sided test.
Variable Min
value
Median Mean Max
value
SD
Ill-health retirements per 1000
police ofﬁcers by force/year
0 2.58 3.40 17.2 2.81
Normal retirements per 1000
ofﬁcers
0 27.1 27.0 47.4 7.0
Crime rate (notiﬁed offences
per 1000 population)
44.0 88.1 91.5 160.7 22.7
Clear-up rate for recorded
crimes (%)
14.0 27.0 28.4 68.0 6.40
Population per ofﬁcer 235 462 447 592 76
Local area unemployment
rate (%)
2.2 4.6 5.0 11.6 1.6
Local area wage relative to
average wage (%)
0.76 0.91 0.95 1.38 0.13
Precept variables
Real police precept levied per
property (£)
0 139 140 218 30
Share of funding raised by local
precept (%)
0 0.27 0.27 0.48 0.08
Number of Band D-equivalent
properties (000s)
162 333 458 3495 497
Population (000s) 484 1012 1355 11,448 1649
Number of billing authorities in
police authority area
2 6 8.7 32 5.2
Number of ofﬁcers in force
(FTEs)
948 2170 3266 32,988 4507
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pay and pensions in the former – although local police authorities in
Britain have a degree of autonomy in the fraction of police funds that
is raised from local sources, in the levels and deployment of police
ofﬁcers and staff, and in the extent of discretionary early retirement
through the route of ill-health.
We describe and simulate the range of pension reforms introduced
in 2006. The changes to accrual rates, date of normal pension age and
indexation have signiﬁcant effects on pension liabilities in the long
run, but most are limited insofar as they only applied to newly
recruited ofﬁcers and would have had no effect until those ofﬁcers
started to retire at some future data. The pension reforms which are
being introduced by 2015 are much more radical insofar as they
apply to all new pension accruals even though longer serving ofﬁcers
will be exempt from their effects. The combined effect of these reforms
therefore is to transfer costs from national taxpayers to police ofﬁcers,
albeit treating generations (cohorts) of police ofﬁcers differentially.
We then focus on the reform of early retirement by police ofﬁcers on
grounds of ill-health. Thiswas subject to a high degree of localmanagerial
discretion but was, until the 2006 reforms, wholly ﬁnanced by national
taxpayers. This incentive problemhas led tohigh levels of ill-health retire-
ment in previous decades and considerable variation across police forces.
After controlling for factors that capture differentially stress of police ofﬁ-
cers across forces we show that the 2006 reform of police pensions re-
duced the rate of ill-health retirement, but largely among those forces
that had been targeted as having ‘high’ rates of ill-health retirement by
the national governments. The effects on pension liabilities are very
small but, unlike the more radical reforms, have an immediate impact.
In the ﬁnal section, we examine the cost-sharing proposals for ﬁ-
nancing new ill-health retirees also implemented in 2006,which shifted
part of the burden onto local police authorities. Since local authorities
vary in their taxable capacity, we test the hypothesis that forces who
wished to have higher-than-average ill-health retirement rates after
this date were prepared to ﬁnance these rates by levying a higher
‘precept’ (tax) on local household properties, once we control for an es-
timate of this taxable capacity. We derive a simple reduced formmodel
to ‘explain’ the determinants of local real precept per head in eachpolice authority. We show that the level of ill-health retirement was
only associated positively with the precept rate from 2006 to 2007 on-
wards, once we control for other factors including taxable capacity.
This strongly ﬁts our prior hypothesis, insofar as there should have
been no relationship between precept and ill-health retirement rates
pre-2006 when all retirements were centrally funded.
The last ﬁnding generates a new ﬁnding on incidence. The princi-
ple of cost-sharing in relation to ill-health retirement suggests that, in
local jurisdictions with a higher taxable capacity, a part of the long
run burden (and indeed a disproportionate amount of the upfront
burden) of ill-health retirement is shifted from national taxpayers
to local taxpayers. In areas where the responsiveness of property
taxes to additional expenditures is likely to be lower, the burden is
shifted from national taxpayers onto police forces, which either
have to reduce ill-health retirement or ﬁnd cost savings elsewhere
in their budgets. The establishment of pension accounts for individual
police forces may have had little impact on pension liabilities in the
short run. However they may preface further reforms in the future.
Further moves toward cost-sharing, for example in relation to pen-
sion costs more generally, and not just ill-health retirement, could
be envisaged in the future whereby a signiﬁcant component of
pension costs over and above employee contributions could be raised
from local taxation. However such reforms are not yet on the agenda.Acknowledgements
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